The USS Yorktown incident, which occurred on 21 September 1997, highlights the issues of computer system defects, human error, and organizational flaws in the context of the information technology industry. The incident was caused by a divide-by-zero error in a database application that resulted in the ship’s control systems failing. The USS Yorktown was part of the Smart Ship program, which aimed to modernize the ship’s control systems using a network of PCs running Windows NT 4.0. The incident raised questions about the reliability and quality of technology solutions, particularly in critical areas such as commerce, health, infrastructure, military, politics, science, security, and transportation. Lessons learned from this incident include the importance of validating input data, handling exceptions in software programs, designing fault-tolerant system components, and allocating sufficient time for software development and testing. Despite the setback, the Smart Ship program continued, but with increased scrutiny and a focus on newer Navy ships.
| Signal | Change | 10y horizon | Driving force |
|---|---|---|---|
| Smart Ship system failure on USS Yorktown | Technological change | Improved validation and exception handling in software systems | Enhancing system reliability and preventing errors |
| Use of Windows NT 4.0 in Navy’s IT infrastructure | Technological change | Adoption of more refined operating systems for control of machinery | A trade-off between control and information transfer |
| Lessons learned from the USS Yorktown incident | Improvement | Enhanced software development practices and fault tolerance | Prioritizing validation, exception handling, and testing |
| Scrutiny on the Smart Ship Program and its budget | Organizational change | Delayed transformation goals for Navy ships | Complexity of retrofitting new technology on legacy systems |