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U.S. and Allies Plan to Secure Submarine Cables, Excluding Chinese Technology, (from page 20241013.)

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Summary

The U.S. and its allies are set to sign a “New York Joint Statement” to enhance the security of global submarine communications cables, excluding Chinese firms. The draft requires undersea cable operators to adopt supply chain and data security measures and mandates reporting of security incidents. It aims to ensure that only trusted suppliers from allied countries are involved, fearing potential disruptions from Chinese companies controlled by the Communist Party. The statement also advocates for transparency in ownership and governance of cable network providers. NATO is exploring automated backups for internet traffic during attacks, but preventive measures for cable security are prioritized.

Signals

name description change 10-year driving-force relevancy
Submarine Cable Security Initiatives Western powers are planning to secure submarine communication cables against potential disruptions. From reliance on global suppliers to a focus on trusted suppliers from allied countries. Increased reliance on domestic and allied technology for critical infrastructure security. Geopolitical tensions and the need for national security in communication infrastructure. 4
Exclusion of Chinese Technology Plans to exclude Chinese firms from submarine cable projects due to security concerns. From global collaboration with Chinese firms to a more isolationist approach in tech supply chains. A fragmented global tech supply chain where trusted allies dominate critical infrastructure. Fear of espionage and sabotage from foreign adversaries, particularly China. 5
Transparency in Ownership Structures Draft encourages clear ownership structures for companies involved in undersea networks. From opaque corporate governance to transparent partnerships and ownership. Greater accountability and trust in the companies managing critical infrastructure. The need for governments to understand who manages their critical communication networks. 4
Automated Backup Systems NATO is developing automated backups for internet traffic in case of attacks. From reliance on undersea cables to potential satellite-based communication backups. A dual-layered communication infrastructure combining undersea cables and satellite systems. The need for resilience in communication systems against geopolitical threats. 3

Concerns

name description relevancy
Supply Chain Vulnerability Dependence on trusted suppliers raises concerns about vulnerabilities and potential disruptions in case of geopolitical tensions. 4
Cybersecurity Risks The potential for foreign governments to exploit vulnerabilities in undersea cable operations could compromise global communications. 5
Geopolitical Tensions Rising tensions between Western powers and China may escalate into conflicts that disrupt global communication infrastructure. 5
Corporate Governance Concerns Lack of transparency in ownership of cable operators could result in unknown risks to the integrity of communication networks. 4
Reliability of Backup Systems While backup systems are being developed, reliance on them may not be sufficient to handle sophisticated attacks. 3
Impact of State Control Chinese state control over its companies could be leveraged to sabotage crucial infrastructure during crises. 5
Regulatory Overreach Restricting vendors based on national origin could lead to reduced competition and innovation in technology sectors. 3

Behaviors

name description relevancy
Securing Submarine Communications Western powers are collaborating to enhance security measures for submarine communications cables, excluding untrusted suppliers from adversarial nations. 5
Trusted Supplier Networks The emphasis on working only with trusted suppliers from allied countries reflects a shift towards securing supply chains in critical infrastructure. 4
Transparency in Ownership Structures Encouraging transparent ownership and governance in undersea cable operations to prevent unknown control reflects a trend towards accountability in tech supply chains. 4
Automated Backup Systems NATO’s initiative to create automated backups for subsea internet traffic indicates a growing reliance on alternative communication systems during potential disruptions. 3
Preventive Security Measures The focus on prevention over cure in protecting infrastructure suggests a proactive approach to cybersecurity and national defense. 5

Technologies

name description relevancy
Submarine Communications Cable Security Efforts to secure global submarine communications cables against potential disruptions from adversarial regimes, focusing on trusted suppliers and security measures. 5
Automated Backup Systems for Internet Traffic NATO’s initiative to create automated systems that redirect subsea internet traffic to satellites in case of attacks on undersea cables. 4
Transparent Ownership and Corporate Governance in Tech Encouragement for undersea cable operators to maintain clear organizational structures to enhance accountability and trustworthiness. 3

Issues

name description relevancy
Securing Submarine Communications Western powers aim to secure undersea communications cables against potential threats from Chinese firms, emphasizing supply chain security and trusted suppliers. 5
Geopolitical Tensions in Tech Infrastructure The exclusion of Chinese companies from critical infrastructure highlights growing geopolitical tensions and the risks of relying on foreign technology. 4
Cybersecurity and Data Security Measures The need for stringent cybersecurity protocols and transparency in ownership structures for undersea cable operators is becoming increasingly urgent. 5
Automated Backup Systems NATO’s development of automated backup systems for internet traffic indicates a shift towards resilience in communication networks amid rising threats. 4
Impact of Geopolitical Events on Global Communications The potential for geopolitical events to disrupt global communications raises concerns about the stability and security of international networks. 4